revoked without notice or hearing. The convict thereupon instituted habeas corpus proceedings for release, claiming that such summary revocation violated due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals construed the pardon to reserve power to revoke without a hearing, and held that the prisoner by accepting it had assented to its terms. 5 The convict then filed a similar petition in the federal district court, which held that if it were free to construe the pardon for itself, it would find that the pardon did not reserve a right to revoke without notice and. hearing, but that it considered itself bound by the contrary construction adopted by the state court, and that the writ should for that reason be refused. 6 Upon appeal, the Circuit summary revocation, or where the release itself contained as one of its conditions a provision that it might be summarily revoked, summary revocation is legal; 8 but where neither the statute nor the instrument itself reserved such a right to revoke without a hearing, a judicial trial is necessary. 339 (1940) , the pardon merely provided that it should be "revocable at the pleasure of the Governor upon violation of any of the laws," etc. The court held that this language "would admit of no reasonable interpretation other than that the Governor reserved the power to revoke the pardon without notice or hearing on violation of its terms." (Italics added.) In Lime v. Blagg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583 (1939), a prisoner was given a "sick parole," to receive treatment for tuberculosis, which provided that he might be recommitted upon his restoration to health. The governor later revoked the parole because the parole board "had concluded" that the prisoner did not have tuberculosis. No hearing was had. The court apparently assumed that the provision for revocation upon restoration to health was to be interpreted to give the governor the power to revoke on this ground without a hearing.
These cases seem wrong; they violate the generally accepted rule that "ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the recipient of the act of grace, and limitations are to be strictly construed. revocation without notice and hearing is unconstitutional.'" It is submitted that the case is right, and that the distinction made in other cases, mentioned above, is wrong on both counts: It should not be deemed constitutional to deprive a parolee or person released on probation or conditional pardon of his freedom without a hearing, even though such summary revocation is specifically provided for. On the other hand, due process does not require a judicial hearing; an informal hearing before the governor or board should be sufficient.
It may be argued that a person at liberty on conditional release should be subject to re-commitment without further trial because he has already had his hearing in his criminal trial. Having been convicted and sentenced, he could legally have been required to serve his full sentence without further process. If the state, instead, releases him on certain conditions before expiration of the full sentence, that is a matter of grace, and if the possibility of summary revocation is one of these conditions, the prisoner has no right to complain. He is not being deprived of any right, but
x IThe Michigan court in 1886 had held a statute unconstitutional insofar as it authorized the warden or other prison official to arrest and remand to prison without a warrant or empowered a trial in the circuit court without a preliminary examination before a magistrate. People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496, 29 N. W. 80 (1886). This actually goes further than Fleenor v. Hammond, supra, because the Michigan statute gave the prisoner a hearing; but the fact that it did not give him as full protection as other criminals accused of crime was held fatal. "If a condition is imposed," the court said, "that he shall not do anything or things, this does not hamper or abridge his rights or liberties until the condition is broken; and in order to remand and confine him in prison again, the fact of the violation of such condition must be established by the due administration of the law, as in 533 merely of a gratuity which the state need not have conferred to begin with.
The court could have gone further. It was not necessary to "grant at once" that pardon is an act of grace. If pardon was once the exercise of mere grace or favor by a personal monarch, that day other cases of the violation of the penal statutes." Id. at 501, 29 N. W. at 82. The court felt certain that no "courts or executives will ever be invested in our State with the power of remanding pardoned convicts back to prison for the alleged violation of the conditions of their pardon, without an arrest by due process of law, and a fair trial, with the same opportunities for defense that are afforded every other citizen when accused of crime." Id. at 505, 29 N. W. at 84. is past. Restricted to its proper sphere, pardon might correctly be referred to as an act of grace, but conditional pardon is today extensively used as a regular release procedure, to serve the purpose of parole. As such, it is part and parcel of our system of criminal administration, and in that administration, the state is required to act in accordance with due process. The courts themselves recognize that it is not true that the power of imposing conditions is wholly unrestricted. In pardon cases, the rule is usually stated that the governor or other pardoning authority may grant pardons on any conditions "not illegal, immoral, or incapable of performance." A condition that a pardon may be revoked on order of the probation officer has been held void.
14 It would seem that a condition permitting revocation without notice and hearing should be declared an illegal condition. It may be suggested that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should apply here. It is established doctrine "that a regulation that would violate a given provision of the federal constitution if directly imposed will violate that same provision if sought to be imposed as a condition to the grant of a privilege which the state is free to grant or withhold. (1904) , a conditional release providing that on violation, the prisoner was to be returned to prison and was to forfeit his statutory good time allowance, was held bad, the court saying that while the governor could attach any conditions not illegal, immoral or impossible, he could not require forfeiture of this statutory privilege. C
Where the statute or the parole or pardon itself provides as one of the conditions of release that the prisoner's liberty may be summarily revoked without a hearing, a further argument is almost always added: that the defendant voluntarily accepted the release on the conditions laid down, and so cannot now be heard to complain. This argument is based upon the oftrepeated but nevertheless wholly absurd proposition that a prisoner has a right to accept or reject such a conditional release. Does any sensible man -on the bench or off-really believe that a convicted criminal has a right to reject probation, pardon, or parole, and insist on keeping his cell or being hanged, even though the proper authorities have ordered him discharged?
It seems amazing, but scores of judicial opinions have solemnly stated that he does."
6 It is true that these statements are almost all mere obiter dicta." All can be traced back to a grandfatherdictum of that master of dictum, Chief Justice John Marshall. In 1833, he stated that "a pardon is a deed, to the validity-of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance," and a pardon "may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered."" It is true that the dictum has remained almost entirely pure dictum. Direct decisions on the point are rare, perhaps because prisoners have rarely preferred to be hanged or imprisoned rather than to accept conditional release. But in 1939 a California prisoner did insist on his alleged right not to be paroled (for the very good reason that the parole was to be to the custody of the Texas authorities who wanted him for an escape on a 30 year sentence); and the California court actually held that he had a right to retain his California cell!
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This decision opens new vistas of prison privileges in California. Perhaps we can say that it gives prisoners a vested right to their maximum punishment. Can a prisoner refuse to work on the prison farm, by refusing to "accept" that sort of limited freedom? Can he "reject" the liberty of using the exercise yard?
If it seems unfair to condemn the California court for actually applying a proposition to which so many other defendant had "waived any informality of procedure by failing to object thereto, when he was taken before the court for the purpose of revoking his probation," though the court also said that he was not entitled to a trial or formal hearing on revocation; and People v. Sanders, 64 Cal. App. 1, 220 Pac. 24 (1923), where, although defendant complained that he had had no notice of revocation, he had in fact had a hearing at which he appeared and was represented by counsel. In the only other case sustaining revocation of probation without notice and hearing, the court merely cited the statute providing for summary revocation, without troubling to discuss its constitutionality. courts had given lip service, it may be pointed out that the fallacious dictum which the California court swallows so blindly had years before been exposed and disowned by the very court which gave it birth. In 1927 the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a case where a federal prisoner condemned to death had been given a commutation by the President to life imprisonment. Sixteen years later, he sued out a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1) that the President had no power to grant a commutation changing the nature and character of the punishment, and (2) to be enforced, and that the convict's consent is not required:
"When we come to the commutation of death to imprisonment for life it is hard to see how consent has any more to do with it than it has in the cases first put. Supposing that Perovich did not accept the change, he could not have got himself hanged against the Executive order. Supposing that he did accept, he could not affect the judgment to be carried out. The considerations that led to the modification had nothing to do with his will.... The opposite answer would permit the President to decide that justice requires the diminution of a term or a fine without consulting the convict, but would deprive him of the power in the most important cases and require him to permit an execution which he had decided ought not to take place unless the change is agreed to by one who on no sound principle ought to have any voice in what the law should do for the welfare of the whole. There is little to add to this statement. One can only wish that courts would read it before indulging in ill-considered statements to the effect that pardon is an act of grace, and that a prisoner has the right to accept or reject.
It was argued by the California court in the Peterson case and has been argued by other courts, that a prisoner must be conceded the right to reject a conditional pardon because the conditions may be more onerous than the punishment fixed by the sentence. But the guaranty against ex post facto laws should be sufficient protection against such an unlikely eventuality.
2 '
Thus, the whole argument based on the premise that "the prisoner accepted the pardon with the condition attached, and so cannot now complain," collapses. He did not accept because he had no privilege to reject. A conditional pardon is not a contract between equals. It is a sovereign act of the state acting through its chief executive, operating upon a subject. In a contract between two parties dealing on an equal standing, they may provide for any sort of conditions they see fit, so long as they are not illegal, immoral or impossible. But when the sovereign state acts upon one of its subjects, it is required to deal with him in accordance with due process of law. Under a conditional pardon, the prisoner is released not by agreement, but by order of the state alone; the conditions upon which he is released and under which he may be returned are not agreed upon by mutual negotiation, but are laid down by the state. It is true that the prisoner is usually required to sign an "agreement" to obey the conditions, but this is not a contract, but merely a means of bringing the conditions home to him. He could be released without such signature, and he could not keep his cell by refusing to sign. His assent is significant only in determining whether the state, in its absolute discretion, would be wise in remental to our system of law that a conditional release more onerous than the original sentence might well be held to violate substantive due process.
29 State v. O'Neal, 147 Wash. 169, 265 Pac. 175 (1928) . This was a probation case, but the statement should be equally applicable to any other kind of conditional release. The Idaho probation statute makes no provision for a hearing, but the Idaho court has held that "common justice would require that he be given a hearing, which was not done in this case." In re Peterson, 19 Idaho 433, 113 Pac. 729 (1911 The majority of state courts already agree, as we have seen, that where the statute or the release does not specifically reserve the power of summary revocation, such revocation without giving the person an opportunity to be heard "is to disregard a principle as old as the law itself." 29 The only argument that can be raised for a different rule where such power is reserved is the argument that the prisoner "accepted" the release with such a condition attached. But if the notion that a prisoner has any power to accept or reject release is exploded, there is no reason for the distinction. Depriving a person so released of his liberty3 upon a charge which he is not allowed to disprove is a violation of due process in every case. Will the Supreme Court uphold the Circuit Court of Appeals in this view? The Supreme Court has in a general way quoted with approval Daniel Webster's classic definition of due process as "a law which hears before it condenms," 30 and has said that the due process clause requires "that state acbecause he has violated some condition which he insists he has not, and without specifying what it is, and without giving him an opportunity to be apprised of the condition and its violation which is claimed to have occurred, and to be heard in his own behalf, violates elementary principles of criminal jurisprudence... "
Revocation of a conditional pardon where there had been no violation of the conditions, merely because later discovered evidence had led the governor to delive that clemency was ill advised, has been held a violation of due process. tion, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base ofiWl our civil and political institutions. "" However, in a case where probation had been revoked by a federal district judge without a hearing, the Supreme Court held that the federal probation act made a hearing mandatory, in order that "he shall have a chance to say his say before the word of his pursuers is received to his undoing." But the court specifically said that this decision rested on the statute, and "we do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes-as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect to its duration as Congress may impose. ' ' 1 2 This is an ominously clear indication that the court would not-agree with the viewpoint of the Circuit Court of Appeals-for obviously the same rationale, based on the concept of probation as an "act of grace" is equally applicable to parole and conditional pardon. Of course, the statement is dictum, and if the court wishes to, it can dismiss it as such. Perhaps it would do so, if the error of the dictum is pointed out.
Four flagrant but persistent errors underlie all the cases which uphold the legality of revocation of conditional releases without notice or hearing:
::1 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278. 80 L. ed. 68?. 56 Sup. Ct. 461. 465 (1936) . 32 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492, 493 (1934 ' should be sufficient to silence this misconception-but it hasn't, even in the United States Supreme Court.
2. That a pardon is a deed, to the validity of which acceptance is neces-* sary. (Has no one ever read Biddle v. Perovich?) 3. That parole is "a kind of conditional pardon" and so requires acceptance too."
